Many purchase decisions rely on complex information. In reality, some consumers may not be well informed and unaware of their lack of information, a situation termed consumer unawareness. This paper investigates how consumer unawareness of preference-product match affects firms' strategies, including product, pricing, and advertising, in a stylized model of market entry. It shows that for entry to occur, the level of unawareness must be intermediate. When entry occurs, firms offer differentiated products to avoid head-on competition and use mixed pricing strategies. As the level of unawareness decreases, both the incumbent and entrant become less competitive in pricing. This paper also analyzes how firms strategically promote consumer awareness through advertising. While the promotion of the entrant helps increase its demand after entry, the promotion of the incumbent can serve as either a barrier or an invitation to entry. Fearing the former, the entrant may not enter, or enter with limited promotion; benefiting from the latter, the entrant may enter and free ride on the incumbent's promotion. As a result of the former situation, a relatively high degree of consumer unawareness is maintained despite competition. This paper also identifies the incumbent's brand equity and promotion costs as critical factors that drive firms' strategic choice. This paper presents economic and managerial implications of the findings. 
many. The most recently launched Vaseline for Men by Unilever highlights another example of the unawareness of a better-fitting product for some male consumers. Such consumer unawareness creates an entry barrier for firms who identified consumers' needs for a new matched consumption. Yet, overcoming consumer unawareness also means great business opportunity. For example, in 1968, Estée Lauder launched Clinique as the world's first allergy-tested, dermatologist-driven skin care product line. However, the line did not take off for several years until the company invested millions of dollars in marketing. In 1978, Clinique sales increased to $80 million, almost 30% of Estée Lauder's total revenues that year. (Koehn 2001) .
In many similar cases of new product diffusion, consumer unawareness of new offerings leads to the obsession with incumbent products. It is not clear how such an environment shapes market entry and competition. While many aspects regarding consumers' lack of information have been extensively studied since the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) , not until recently have a few aspects regarding consumer unawareness been examined (e.g., Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Li, Peitz and Zhao 2010) . This paper intends to explore this issue in depth.
Specifically, in a duopoly framework, this paper investigates how consumer unawareness affects market entry and firms' competitive strategies in product and pricing; and in turn, how firms strategically manage consumer unawareness via promotion. In the model, consumers are heterogeneous in preferences and information. Some consumers are aware of one possible product (termed special product) serving them better than the prevailing one (termed generic product) sold by the incumbent, whereas some are not aware. The entrant intends to offer the special product to those consumers. Yet, the entrant faces the barrier caused by consumer unawareness and the incumbent's pre-emptive moves. We argue that, in equilibrium, the entrant will launch the special product if and only if consumer unawareness is not too low or too high.
When entry occurs, both firms use mixed pricing strategies. As the level of unawareness decreases, they become less competitive in pricing; also, the entrant's profit increases, but the incumbent's profit may first decrease and then increase.
When both firms can promote consumer awareness, the entrant may do so to increase the demand for the special product. However, the promotion of the incumbent can serve as either a barrier or an invitation to entry. Fearing the former, the entrant may not enter, or enter with limited promotion; benefiting from the latter, the entrant may enter and free ride on the incumbent's promotion. Thus, competition does not necessarily lead to more promotions of consumer awareness.
We identify two factors that crucially determine the market equilibrium: The incumbent's market establishment, as reflected by its brand equity, and the effectiveness of promotion, as reflected by the unit cost of promotion. For instance, when brand equity is low, expecting the entrant to price aggressively, the incumbent may promote consumer awareness to soften the competition, although it does not offer the special product. When promotion cost is low, the incumbent is more likely to deter entry through promotion. As a result, a lower cost of promotion actually makes the entry more difficult.
Conceptually, there is a clear distinction between unawareness and uncertainty (Li, et al. 2010 ). Uncertainty, or "known unknowns", implies that a decision maker does not know the exact state at a moment of time. The decision maker is typically associated with full awareness of all possible states in a decision set, including their existence and all related consequences. In comparison, unawareness, or "unknown unknowns", implies that a decision maker is associated with incomplete knowledge of the states in a decision set. Hence, he either ignores the existence of some states or only knows incomplete consequences related to some states. 2 This paper contributes to the growing body of literature that studies the relationship between consumers' bounded rationality and firms' marketing strategies. In particular, some studies examine how consumer forgetfulness-"unknown knowns"influences firms' pricing decisions. For example, Villas-Boas and Villas-Boas (2008) show how consumer forgetfulness regarding their preferences affects the time interval between sales. More recently, Chen, Iyer and Pazgal (2010) have studied the effects of limited memory and categorization on duopoly price competition. In comparison, we investigate the influence of consumer unawareness, or "unknown unknowns," on firms' competitive strategies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literature. In Section 3, we set up the basics. Section 4 analyzes the benchmark model with exogenous consumer unawareness. Section 5 analyzes the extension with consumer unawareness endogenously determined by firms through promotion. We discuss some modeling issues for clarification in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7. A demonstration of unawareness and proofs of intermediate results, lemmas, corollaries, and propositions are in the appendix.
Related Literature in Consumer Unawareness
Economic literature dating back to Simon (1955) has discussed the reasons for individual unawareness, yet not until recently did unawareness receive more attention. Dekel, Barton and Rustichini (1998) show that the standard model of information structure cannot formulate unawareness. Modica and Rustichini (1999) consider a modified information partition model to formulate unawareness in an individual decision making setting. Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) and Li (2009) present frameworks that formulate interactive unawareness. Applied work incorporating unawareness is growing in some fields such as industrial organization and finance (for a review, see Spiegler 2011 ). Yet, most of the studies investigate the unawareness of product features that lead to vertical differentiation, in the form of information shrouding. In contrast, this paper focuses on consumer unawareness of horizontally differentiated products.
Specifically, our paper is closely related to three papers. The first is by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) . In their model, firms sell products that are composites of a base good and add-ons. Firms choose not to educate consumers about the price of add-ons when add-ons have close substitutes.
While naive consumers are unaware of the price of add-ons and suffer from unexpected high costs, informed consumers exploit the existing low price of the base good and cheap, close substitutes. In contrast, this paper considers horizontally differentiated products and focuses on consumer heterogeneity in both information and preferences.
The second paper by Li, et al. (2010) studies a monopoly firm that has private information about its product's degree of adverse effects. In one case, they allow the representative consumer be aware but uncertain about the adverse effects; in the other case, the consumer is unaware of the adverse effects. They show how mandatory disclosure of private information can affect the total welfare and consumer surplus. Their study complements ours by allowing aware consumers to be Bayesian and by emphasizing the difference between uncertainty and unawareness. By comparison, our study incorporates competition and market entry.
Finally, Kamenica, Mullainathan and Thaler (2011) study how firms can assist consumers when they lack the data on their individual usage of services. While they do not incorporate unawareness, they address a similar issue in that consumers may know too little about their preference types and are unable to find a good match. They find that mandatory information disclosure of the usage data does not always improve consumer welfare, as it can lead to higher prices in equilibrium. Similar to their results, we find reducing unawareness may lead to higher prices and lower consumer welfare. However, we focus on firms' competitive strategies such as product decisions and promotion decisions.
Model Setup
There is a cohort of consumers on the market with the total size normalized to one. With 0 < λ <1, a fraction λ of consumers, termed special consumers, demand some particular attribute of the underlying product to meet their consumption needs. All other consumers, termed general consumers, do not have such consumption complexity.
A generic product (denoted by G) matches the needs of general consumers but not those of special consumers. A special product (denoted by S), a modification of G, can satisfy the needs of special consumers as well as those of general consumers. Each consumer needs one unit of the product to satisfy his/her needs, and values it at v >0. Hence, when consumers know their type, a general consumer has a valuation of v for both G and S, 3 but a special consumer has a valuation of v for S and a lower valuation for G. Such a low valuation can even be negative if special consumers receive disutility from a mismatch. For expositional purposes, we set the valuation under mismatch to zero (results for a general specification can be obtained from the authors).
The modeling setting reflects the basic idea of product differentiation where new products evolve from the base product to satisfy the needs of newly identified consumer segments.
Without loss of generality, the marginal cost of G is normalized to zero, and the marginal cost of S is c > 0. Both firms have the same production costs.
Consumer Information Type and Unawareness
3 General consumers' valuation for S depends on the nature of modification, and can be equal to, less than, or greater than v.
Specifically, when the modification horizontally differentiates the two products (as in the case of golf clubs for the left-handed), general consumers may have a smaller valuation than v for S. When the modification vertically makes S better (e.g., high quality, more functional), general consumers may have a greater valuation for S. Finally, when general consumers perceive the modification to be irrelevant (as in the case of hypoallergenic products), their valuation remains at v. This paper assumes the last case which is more prevalent in many categories.
We describe consumers' information types. While some special consumers (with a fraction λ -θ, 0 < θ < λ) are aware of their needs for the match, other special consumers (with a fraction θ) are not, and hence, make purchase decisions as general consumers do. Thus, θ measures the degree of consumer unawareness in the market.
Consumer unawareness is persistent in this paper. 4 Consumers do not become automatically aware of the match without using the product for at least a certain period. This assumption follows behavioral studies where over-confidence (Hoch and Deighton 1989; Alba and Hutchinson 2000) , or limited cognitive capability and experience (Bloch, Sherrell and Ridgway 1986; Aragones, et al. 2005) can contribute to the persistency of consumer unawareness.
As general consumers value S and G equally at v, whether or not they are unaware of the difference between G and S does not affect their purchase decisions and the subsequent market outcome. Hence, we impose no restrictions on the information types of general consumers.
Asymmetric Duopoly
We consider the game between two asymmetric firms: Firm 1 is a big established firm that already sells G on the market, and firm 2 is a small firm that plots its entry. The two firms differ in three aspects. First, in terms of market establishment, firm 1 enjoys a consumer-based brand equity (Keller 1993) , 0 b ≥ , interpreted as the price premium that consumers are willing to pay for the value created by brand name associations and perceptual distortions (Kamakura and Russell 1993) . Such a price premium, as Aaker (1996) claimed, "is the best single measure of brand equity." Firm 2, however, is new to the market and does not have any consumer loyalty.
Second, in terms of operations management, firm 1 can manage to produce and sell both G and S by incurring a fixed supply-chain cost, k > 0; whereas firm 2 can manage to produce and sell only one product (either G or S). Finally, in terms of business responsiveness, firm 2 moves ahead of firm 1 in both promotion and production; firm 1 does not anticipate firm 2's entry, which is consistent with the literature on small firms (e.g., Acs and Audretsch 1990).
To focus on non-trivial cases, we assume firm 2 incurs an irreversible entry cost, f, which is less than the highest profit collectible from all special consumers: 0 ( ) f v c λ < < − . Table 1 summarizes the perceived valuation obtained by different types of consumers from the different firms/products.
_______________________________________
Insert Table 1 about here _________________________________________
Benchmark Model
We start with the benchmark model where firms take consumer unawareness as exogenous.
No preemption constraint
We first we first identify the condition under which firm 1 offers G only as a monopoly when not threatened by firm 2's entry.
Following Table 1 , firm 1's monopoly profit by offering G, denoted by 1
firm 1's monopoly profit by offering both products, denoted by 1 
GS M
π yields the no preemption constraint given below, which we assume to hold for the duopoly competition.
The no preemption constraint suggests that for offering G only to be optimal, there should be a sufficient number of unaware special consumers.
Timeline
The game consists of three stages. In stage 1, firm 2 makes an entry by choosing one product, either G or S, to offer, or does not act -in which case the game ends. If firm 2 enters, in stage 2, firm 1 observes firm 2's move and decides whether to add S to its product line. In stage 3, when both firms are on the market, they simultaneously set prices to compete as a duopoly.
The timeline of the game is depicted as follows.
Using backward induction, we begin with the price-competition stage where firms' product choices are given; we then analyze the product-choice stage.
Analysis
In the duopoly competition, there are four subgames in terms of product offerings given as follows:
Firm 2 sells S
Whenever the offerings of the two firms overlap, the price competition is a Nash Bertrand competition. When the two firms offer distinct products, only mixed-strategy equilibria in pricing exist. We compute the two firms' equilibrium expected profits following standard procedure (e.g., Shilony 1977; Narasimhan 1988 ; the derivation is provided in Appendix II), and report the total equilibrium payoffs in Table 2 .
_______________________________________
Insert Table 2 about here _________________________________________ From Table 2 , it is straightforward to see that firm 2's payoff is always -f when the two firms' offerings overlap. Hence, it is only possible for firm 2 to enter with S in Subgame 2.
Nevertheless, to show Subgame 2 to be a SPNE, we also need to show that firm 1 does not want to offer S upon firm 2's entry, as in Subgame 4.
Denote firm 1's equilibrium profits in Subgames 2 and 4 as 1D G π * and 1D GS π * , respectively. By 
Immediately following the above two equations, we have the following lemma.
, and vice versa, where
Lemma 1 highlights the influence of cannibalization on firm 1's choice of product offerings upon firm 2's entry. The intuition is that, when offering the full product line {G, S}, firm 1 has to decrease its price of S to b + c in order to compete with firm 2 on the special consumer segment.
As a result, the price of G has to fall to b + c to remain attractive to general consumers, who otherwise would purchase S instead. Although firm 1 creates a larger consumer base by offering the full product line, when it has small brand equity, i.e., ( ) b b θ <  , the benefit is outweighed by cannibalization as well as the fixed cost of offering multiple products. It is easy to see that when
No-Preemption Constraint is satisfied (i.e.,θ > Θ ), firm 1 will offer G only (see Appendix II A3
for the proof).
We now examine firm 2's profitability upon entry. Firm 2's equilibrium expected profit in
Eq. (5) implies that firm 2 needs a sufficient number of aware-special consumers for to break even. This condition determines the upper bound of the degree of unawareness at which firm 2 enters, denoted as θ :
Based on Lemma 1, the equilibrium product-offering strategies are characterized in Proposition It is consistent with the literature which argues that large brand equity gives a firm advantage forming significant entry barriers (Bonanno 1986; Smiley 1988) . However, the effect of brand equity is not limited to the preemption considered here. More on this will be discussed in the next section.
When firm 2 enters in equilibrium, Corollaries 1 and 2 respectively describe the relationships of the degree of unawareness and the two firms' average prices and profits.
COROLLARY 1. In equilibrium where firm 2 enters, when the degree of unawareness decreases, both firms' average prices increase.
Corollary 1 suggests that when the degree of unawareness decreases, in equilibrium firm 2 is more willing to focus on special consumers and hence, less willing to undercut firm 1 for the general consumers. When firm 2 prices less aggressively, so does firm 1. The result also implies that, if awareness is exogenously increased (e.g., through public campaign or government intervention), the welfare improvement is not Pareto. Specifically, while some unaware-special consumers will gain awareness, and benefit from a better match, other consumers, including aware-special consumers and general consumers, will lose; they now pay a higher price.
COROLLARY 2. In equilibrium where firm 2 enters, when the degree of unawareness decreases, firm 2's profit increases and firm 1's profit may first decrease and then increase.
This result follows Equations (2) and (5). As the degree of unawareness decreases, firm 2 obtains a larger consumer base. Consequently, firm 2 can raise prices and earns a larger profit.
For firm 1, the decrease of unawareness reduces its consumer base and hurts its profitability (the direct effect); however, firm 1 benefits from the less aggressive pricing of firm 2 (the indirect effect). When the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, firm 2's profit decreases, and vice versa. In the next section, we will revisit this result when firms can promote awareness.
Awareness Promotion
In this section, we consider the scenario in which firms can promote consumer awareness. The objective of the promotion is to educate unaware-special consumers about the needs of match for consumption. Hence, the promotion is category-specific rather than brand-specific. As firms cannot a priori identify consumer type, promotions are non-targeting.
Timeline of Duopoly Problem with Promotion
Since firm 1 has no intention to offer S when acting as a monopoly, it is natural to assume that firm 2 moves ahead of firm 1 in targeting special consumers, and the two firms sequentially make promotional decisions. The timeline of the new game is given below. In stage 1, firm 2 decides whether or not to enter, and if it does, it decides how much promotion is needed. In stage 2, firm 1 decides its promotion. If firm 2 does not enter, the game ends. The rest of the game is identical to the benchmark model.
Promotional Technology
Using the advertising response function developed by Butters (1977) , we model the percentage change of the degree of unawareness as
μ'< μ , where μ and μ' are the pre-promotional and post-promotional degrees of unawareness, respectively; hence, (μ-μ')/μ is equivalent to the probability that an unaware special consumer becomes aware. A is a firm's total promotional efforts measured in the monetary unit; α is the unit cost of promotional packet that guarantees a "conversion" of an unaware special consumer. Each one of A/α promotional packets is randomly and independently sent to all consumers with equal probability. When the number of consumers is large, the probability with which an unaware special consumer receives at least one packet is We rewrite Eq. (7) in terms of the promotional cost to reduce the degree of unawareness from μ to μ':
Note that ' 0 A < and '' 0 A > , suggesting the marginal return of promotion is decreasing.
Preliminary Analysis
It is easy to verify that the no preemption constraint specified in the benchmark model still guarantees that firm 1 offers G only in the monopoly market. 5 Nevertheless, the no preemption constraint no longer guarantees that firm 1 offers G only in the duopoly, since it can alter the unawareness through promotions prior to its product decision when facing entry.
We denote the initial degree of unawareness prior to any promotion as θ, the degree of unawareness ex post firm 2's promotion as θ', and the degree of unawareness ex post firm 1's promotion as θ". If firm 1 does not promote, θ" = θ'; if firm 2 does not promote, θ' = θ.
In the stage of price competition, we denote firm 1's equilibrium profits in Subgames 2 and
, respectively. In Table 2 they are given as
Replace θ with " θ in Eq. (4) shown in Lemma 1, we obtain the same result regarding the market equilibrium ex post promotion:
5 It is because firm 1 does not promote when it offers G only, or when it offers both G and S. To see why, consider when firm 1
, which increases in the degree of unawareness. If it offers both G and S, firm 1's profit is (1 ') 
. Note the profit margin of S, v+b-c, is lower than that of G, v +b. Again, firm 1 does not gain through promotion.
Thus, for any 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Firm 1's decisions Firm 2's decisions
Proposition 2 implies that the entry and promotion behavior is complex. Upon firm 2's entry, three types of promotion are possible: either firm promotes, or none promotes. The most interesting case is that firm 1 promotes and firm 2 free rides on the effort. This happens when the optimal degree of unawareness of firm 1 is lower than that of firm 2's, or when The first two points show that promotion helps firm 2 to enter under even higher degree of unawareness than in the benchmark model. It also implies that a more effective promotion technology lowers entry barriers. Point 3 demonstrates that, although firm 2 may free ride on firm 1's promotion, it happens only if firm 1's brand equity is sufficiently low. This is because only then does firm 1 expect firm 2 to act aggressively in pricing, and is more willing to promote to soften the competition. Point 4 shows that firm 1 does not promote when brand equity or the cost of promotion is sufficiently large.
Next, we analyze the market equilibrium when firm 1's brand equity θ , firm 1 can decide how it wants the consumer unawareness to be: It can set " ( , ] θ θ θ ∈ to accommodate entry, or set " ( , ] θ θ θ ∉ to deter entry. In the first case, it earns a profit of
In the second case, firm 1 remains a monopoly and has two product choices:
1. To offer G only at a price equal to v+b with a profit of
2. To offer the full product line {G, S} with both prices equal to v+b and a profit of
Correspondingly, define
Does not promote
Proposition 3 shows that with promotion, firm 2 may enter when the original consumer unawareness, θ, is within the range of 0
( , ] θ θ  . The effect of promotion is two-fold. It enables entry for high θs, as shown in Corollary 3. It also restricts entry for low θs, because the lower bound of pro-entry θ is 0 θ , which is greater than θ , the minimum degree of " θ for which firm 1 accommodates entry. This is due to the strategic effect of promotion: when unawareness is relatively low, firm 1 can over-promote to deter the entry for a high profit. Proposition 3 also shows when and why firm 2 under-promotes consumer awareness. If firm 2 promotes too much, firm 1 free rides on firm 2's promotional efforts by offering both products. Therefore, an equilibrium may prevail where no firms promote or only firm 2 under-promotes. As a result, a relatively high degree of consumer unawareness is maintained despite competition. Corollary 4 suggests that a more effective promotion technology does not necessarily result in more awareness promotion, nor does it necessarily induce market entry and competition.
While a high cost of promotion may discourage firm 2's entry, as it cannot afford a large promotion to lift the demand, a low cost of promotion may allow firm 1 to deter firm 2's entry, as firm 1 can easily manage consumer unawareness. In the extreme, when the promotion cost is zero, firm 2 may never enter.
Discussion: Established firms often create entry barriers by using heavy advertising to differentiate their own products from new products, namely, generating high brand equity (see Smiley (1988) for empirical evidence and Bonanno (1986) for theoretical argument). Our analysis demonstrates subtle effects of brand equity: In the benchmark model, no entry deterrence is associated with firm 1's brand equity b; in the model with promotions, firm 1 with high brand equity may deter entry, while firm 1 with low brand equity may invite entry.
The effect of brand equity can be understood as follows. First, note that we impose the no preemption constraint such that for firm 1 the cost of offering multiple products outweighs the gain under a monopoly. If the no preemption constraint does not hold, then firm 1 always offers both G and S, and firm 2's entry is unprofitable as a result of price competition of homogeneous products. Other things equal, the no preemption constraint becomes more restrictive when brand equity increases. Hence, a sufficiently high brand equity will cause firm 1 to offer S and preempt the market of special consumers.
Second, when the no preemption constraint holds, the effect of brand equity depends on the interaction of price competition, intra-brand cannibalization, as well as promotion. In the benchmark model, although offering both products helps firm 1 to deter entry, it is too costly due to intra-brand cannibalization between G and S, in addition to the fixed cost. Thus, firm 1 does not deter entry. In the model with promotion, if firm 2 promotes awareness, then more special consumers are only interested in S. As a direct effect (by holding firm 2's pricing) firm 1's profit decreases when it offers G only. Therefore, at the present level of unawareness, firm 1 may switch to offer both products. The actual result critically depends on the level of brand equity.
When brand equity is high, it is more likely that the benefit of adding more consumer base outweighs the cost of cannibalization and the fixed cost. Thus, entry deterrence is more likely.
When brand equity is too low, then not only is entry accommodated, firm 1 may promote and essentially invite entry. It is because, as an indirect effect, promoting awareness softens the competition.
To sum up, the strategic advantage of high brand equity and the strategic disadvantage of low brand equity are both amplified when unawareness can be reduced by promotions. Moreover, it can be argued that the advertising related to brand equity is more persuasive and the advertising related to awareness is more informational. Our findings thus offer some insight into the interaction between the two types of advertising.
The above analysis also illustrates a phenomenon that we term "pioneer victim": If the first mover (firm 2) fails to recognize the strategic effect of promotion and brand equity in our context, it can fall victim to its pioneer marketing activities. Such activities shape the market environment to benefit firm 2 in the short term, but prompt firm 1's entry, and may eventually hurt firm 2 in the long term. If firm 2 cannot quickly build consumer loyalty or other competitive advantages before firm 1's entry, what it has done on the market environment will favor only firm 1. In fact, knowing that firm 2 is myopic, firm 1 may prefer to act more slowly than firm 2 to free ride on its marketing efforts later on. Hence, our study provides an alternative explanation to why pioneer firms eventually concede their leading places to late-but big-comers, as documented in empirical studies (Golder and Tellis 1993).
General Discussion
There are several issues in the model that we would like to clarify here. First, we model consumer unawareness specifically on preference-product match, which should not be confused with unawareness on brand or product. Indeed, in our model, after the entry of firm 2, unaware consumers know that product S is available.
Second, traditional rational models often incorporate consumer bias by attributing consumers with imperfect information. In such cases, uninformed consumers are nevertheless fully aware, as they are attributed with a full set of possible states. In addition, advertising or promotions can only modify their beliefs by Bayesian update. We deviate by allowing consumers to have an incomplete set of states such that advertising can add new states in consumer's posterior belief. Researchers may wonder how our approach differs from the traditional approach, or how our results can be rationalized via modified information (Spiegler 2011 ).
To address this issue, consider replacing all unaware consumers with uninformed Bayesian consumers. In the simplest case, the uninformed know that they are of the type of general consumers with probability q, 0 < q < 1, or of the type of special consumers with probability 1-q. 
It is easy to see that, relative to unaware consumers, uninformed consumers have a lower value for G and an identical value for S. For the former to be close to the unaware consumers' value for G, q would have to be close to 1. It implies that the proportion of special-consumer type among uninformed consumers, 1-q, must be very small. If this is true, then the model with promotion is not interesting, because firm 2 has little interest in promoting information of match to uninformed consumers, regardless of firm 1's strategic reaction. Conversely speaking, for firm 2 to have sufficient incentive to promote the information of match, the proportion of specialconsumer type must be sufficiently large. Then, the ex-ante valuation of G, q(v+b) , is much lower than that of unaware consumers as well as that of general consumers. This change may considerably affect firms' equilibrium pricing strategies derived in the benchmark model. For example, for firm 1 there will be a trade-off between attracting only general consumers and attracting both general consumers and uninformed special consumers.
In conclusion, we doubt that any traditional rational model can replicate the predictions of the models presented in this paper by simply replacing unaware consumers with uninformed ones. The main reason is that belief update in traditional models is more "consistent" than in our model.
Finally, additional distinction emerges if we extend the model by allowing consumers to learn useful information. Plausibly, it is more difficult for unaware consumers to learn aspects that they are unaware of, as they simply do not perceive these uncertainties. Because of this, in order to induce learning, effective advertising would be costly. In traditional models, uninformed consumers want to learn because they are driven by the perceived uncertainties. Hence, less costly advertising may still be effective.
Conclusion, Limitation and Managerial Implications
While sellers must make consumers aware of a product in order to sell it, very often it is also true that, to have consumers stay with existing products, sellers must keep them unaware of the benefits of better alternatives. This paper explores how firms compete in product offerings, pricing, and promotion under consumer unawareness about preference-product match. The analysis shows that it requires a moderate degree of unawareness to entice market entry. When firms compete after entry, a low degree of unawareness makes their pricing less competitive, and the entrant more profitable; but the incumbent does not always gain. When firms can promote consumer awareness, the entrant may strategically under-promote the awareness, and, essentially, suppress the potential demand for its products. Conversely, the incumbent may strategically promote to deter entry or soften competition. Together with the initial degree of unawareness, the establishment of the incumbent and the effectiveness of promotion technology are also critical in determining the strategic choices of both firms. These findings suggest that, given a proper market environment, consumer unawareness affects firms' competitive strategies profoundly.
Managerially, consumer unawareness precludes a suitable product-which offers consumers a better match-from being consumed. Opportunities arise when firms identify the existence of such a match, launch new products that align with the match, and promote consumer awareness of the products (Epstein 2000). However, anecdotal observations suggest that the process is not always as smooth as it sounds when factors such as competition, cannibalization, logistics, and culture are taken into account. For example, when Budweiser launched Bud Light in 1982 with lower alcohol and calorie content to cater to the 25-to 44-year-old professionals, the rapid growth of Bud Light sales was largely at the expense of its regular Budweiser brand sales rather than the competing Miller Lite (Munching 1998 In response to the challenges brought up by consumer unawareness, our research provides important insights for managers who consider entering a new market or launching a new product with a prerequisite of educating consumers about their unknown needs. As Hoch and Deighton (1989) suggest, market leaders usually avoid educating their consumers with new product
knowledge. Yet, we find that for small firms, it might also be less desirable to fully promote consumer awareness, as doing so may entice big firms to free ride on their promotional efforts by entering the segment afterwards, resulting in a head-on competition. Conversely, for large firms, it is not always a bad situation if it cannot move before myopic small firms, as the promotion of consumer awareness can be converted into a second-mover advantage.
Our study is limited in that consumer learning is only promotion-based. We are aware that consumer awareness can be triggered in a market where consumers interact with each other, or when they search for general information. Subsequently, unaware consumers can learn about their type, and which product is suitable for their type. Further analyses are needed to explore the different tools to trigger consumer awareness, and how consumers dynamically respond to those tools.
Another important direction for future research is to examine how consumers distinguish a true match from an artificial one imposed via firms' marketing efforts. An entrant firm may claim a questionable matched consumption (e.g., should toothpaste be made gender-specific).
How shall the incumbent respond? Shall the incumbent accept the claim and does what we
analyze in the paper? Or shall it try directly disproving the claim and maintaining consumer confidence in its product? What are the driving factors?
Finally, this paper offers several theoretical findings, which can be empirically tested. We expect that future research will develop practical measures of consumer unawareness on the market level, and test its impact on firms' entry and competitive strategies. 
θ"
The fraction of unaware special consumers in the population after both firms finish promotion
θ'
The fraction of unaware special consumers in the population after firm 1 finishes promotion
the upper bound of θ" for firm 2 to be profitable to enter when it fully promotes 
Figure 1 Firm 1's Promotion and Product Decisions
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Appendix I
To demonstrate the concept of unawareness in the context we study here, we can use the example of acoustic guitars. The match between a consumer (guitar player) and a product (guitar) depends on multiple aspects of consumer preferences. For the purpose of demonstration, we only consider two aspects. Firstly, consumers differ in whether they are right-handed or left-handed.
(Some consumers may be able to play both ways, but we ignore this case.) We denote this aspect Finally, please note that whether awareness is full or not, consumers can be uncertain about their types. To account for that, standard approaches using prior beliefs may apply, and then consumers evaluate the products by computing expected utility.
Appendix II
A1. The derivation of equilibria in the price-competition stage.
In Stage 3, the equilibrium prices and profits are as follows.
i. If both firms offer the generic product, then
ii. If firm 1 offers both products and firm 2 offers the generic product, then
iii. If firm 1 offers both products and firm 2 offers the special product, then
iv. If firm 1 offers the generic product and firm 2 offers the special product, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the pricing rules are as follows.
Definex = (λ − θ)(v − c) + c. Firm 1's price distribution has support over the interval [x + b, v + b] , and the cumulative distribution function is
Firm 2's price distribution has support over the interval [x, v] , and the cumulative distribu-
The profits are π 1 = (1 − λ + θ)(x + b) and π 2 = (λ − θ)(v − c).
When both firms offer G, they compete in the Bertrand fashion: One firm's best response to each other's price is a lower price until at least one of them breaks even. Hence, firm 2 sets a price equal to the marginal cost and firm 1 sets a price equal to the marginal cost plus the brand loyalty. It explains point i.
When firm 1 offers both product types and firm 2 offers G, they still compete on G in the Bertrand fashion. But firm 1 sets the price of S at v+b, which is the highest price that aware special consumers are willing to pay, because any of the lower prices will not increase firm 1's profit. Firm 1's profit is therefore
. Firm 2's profit is zero. This explains point ii.
When firm 1 offers both product types and firm 2 offers S, they compete on S in the Bertrand fashion. Firm 2 charges a price of S equal to the marginal cost. Firm 1 sets the price of S equal to the marginal cost plus the brand loyalty. For general consumers and unaware special consumers, G and S are perfect substitutes, therefore any price of G higher than the price of S will not increase firm 1's profit, and any lower price will decrease firm 1's profit.
Hence, the price of S is c+b. Firm 1's profit is
Firm 2's profit is zero. This explains point iii.
The proof of point iv.
The proof takes three steps. In step 1 we identify the best reply function of each firm in the price competition, then show pure-strategy equilibria do not exist. In step 2 we construct a strategy profile that is a candidate of mixed-strategy equilibrium. In step 3 we show that such a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Step 1. Given p S 2 ≥ c, firm 1 sets the highest price such that general consumers prefer the generic product over the special product, namely
where > 0. Note firm 1 has no incentives to undercut firm 2 for special consumers, because by assumption these consumers have zero valuations about the generic product.
Given p G 1 ≥ 0, firm 2 may set a price that just undercuts firm 1 and earn p G 1 − b − − c > 0, where > 0, or set a price equal to v and earn (v − c)(λ − θ). For firm 2 to be better off in the first case, it must be that
Given these best reply functions, we show that no pure-strategy equilibria exist. For any p G 1 = x >x + b, the best reply of firm 2 is x − b − , with respect to which the best reply of firm 1 is x − b − + b − < x − . Thus, firms undercut each other until x =x + b. When that happens, firm 2's best reply becomes v. In turn, firm 1's best reply is v + b − >x + b.
The cycle renews. Therefore, in the price competition, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
Step 2. We construct a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, firm 1 randomizes its price over the interval of [x + b, v + b], and firm 2 randomizes its price over the interval of [x, v] . Note that when p S 2 = v, independent of firm 1's price, firm 2 always earns a constant profit of (v − c)(λ − θ); when p S 2 < v, firm 2 earns a profit of
.
We assume when common consumers are indifferent between two firms, they buy from either one with the same probability. In addition, assume in equilibrium prob(p
For a mixed strategy to hold, the two profits must equal, or
Replacing p S
2 by x − b, we solve the probability distribution that defines firm 1's strategy:
Consider firm 2's strategy. Note for any p S 2 >x, by setting p G 1 =x + b, firm 1 earns a profit equal to (1 − λ + θ)(x + b) . When firm 1 uses p G 1 >x + b, it expects to earn a profit equal to
Again assume that in equilibrium prob(p S 2 = p G 1 − b) = 0, for all p S 2 used by firm 2. For a mixed strategy to hold, the two profits must equal, or
Replacing p G 1 − b by y, we can solve the probability that defines firm 2's strategy:
Note that p S 2 = v is a mass point with prob(p S 2 = v) =x +b v+b .
Step 3. We need to show this mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium. In other words, we need to show each firm's strategy is optimal given the other firm's strategy. Fixing the mixed strategy of firm 1, we define an arbitrary mixed strategy of firm 2 by a cumulative density function F 2 over [c, v] . The expected profit of firm 2 iś
The first equality follows that prob(p G 1 ≥x + b) = 1 and firm 2 always earns a constant profit of (v − c)(λ − θ) when firm 1's strategy is fixed and p S 2 ≥x. The last equality follows x = (v − c)(λ − θ) + c. This shows that firm 1's strategy is optimal given firm 2's strategy.
Likewise, we define an arbitrary mixed strategy of firm 1 by a cumulative density function
Fixing the mixed strategy of firm 2, the expected profit of firm 1 iś
The first equality follows that prob{p S 2 ≥x} = 1 and firm 1 always earns a constant profit of (1 − λ + θ)(x + b) when firm 2's strategy is fixed and p S 2 ≥x. This shows that firm 1's strategy is optimal given firm 2's strategy. In conclusion, the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
A2. The proof of Lemma 1.
The proof is straightforward and is skipped.
A3. The proof of Proposition 1. A5. The proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. First we interpret θ * , θ * , andθ. When firm 1 promotes, solving the first order condition, the θ that maximizes π G * 1 (θ ) − A(θ |θ ) is given by θ * . Similarly, if firm 2 promotes, the θ that maximizes (λ − θ )(v − c) − f − A(θ |θ) is θ * . Since firm 1's profit without promotion is positive, its profit at the optimal level is also positive. However, firm 2's optimal profit may be negative. For firm 2 to enter with non-negative profit, it must hold that
Thus, the highest level of θ under which firm 2 earns a non-negative profit isθ = Whenever θ * ≤ θ, the post-promotion degree of unawareness may be set by firm 1 at θ * . Also, when θ * ≤θ, firm 2 can earn a non-negative profit at θ * with no promotion. So θ * ≤ min{θ,θ} constitutes Condition 1 for both firms to accept θ * . But firm 2 may instead promote θ = θ * . For firm 2 not to do so, the benefit from promoting by itself must be less or equal to the benefit from free riding on firm 1's promotion, or
This is Condition 2 as (θ * − θ * )(v − c) ≤ A(θ * |θ).
Condition 1 for both firms to accept θ * is θ * ≤ min{θ,θ} , because then promoting the level of unawareness to θ * is viable for firm 2 and firm 2 will be profitable. For firm 2 not want to free ride on firm 1's promotion, the benefit from promoting by itself must be greater, or
This is Condition 2 as (θ * − θ * )(v − c) > A(θ * |θ). Note that it also ensures that firm 1 does not further promote to θ * , because θ * ≥ θ * .
When θ ≤ min{θ * , θ * ,θ}, promotion is not viable for either firm, but firm 2's profit is non-negative, so it enters without promotion.
Finally, in other cases, firm 2 does not enter. Firm 1 stays unchanged.
A6. The proof of Corollary 3.
Proof. Point 1 is straightforward because neither Condition 1 nor Condition 2 imposes any restriction on the upside of the range of θ . 
For it to hold, first 4α(1 + ln θ − ln θ * ) − (b −b) > 0, or b − v + 2c + 2λ(v − c) < 4α(1 + ln θ − ln θ * ).
Second, reorganizing Inequality 3, we obtain that b + c + 2λ(v − c) < 2α(1 + ln θ − ln θ * ) 2 .
Thus, only small value of b satisfies the inequalities. A7. The proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. For firm 2 to be profitable, it is necessary that firm 1 accommodates the entry by offering G only. Thus, in the price-competition stage, it must be true thatπ G * 1 (θ ) > π GS * 1 (θ ). As in Lemma 1, it is equivalent to that b < (1 − λ + θ )(v − c) + 
